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Abstract The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging
network paradigm that aims to obtain the interactions
among pervasive things through heterogeneous networks.
Security is an important task in the IoT. Luo et al. (Secur
Commun Netw 7(10): 1560–1569, 2014) proposed a cer-
tificateless online/offline signcryption (COOSC)
scheme for the IoT (hereafter called LTX). Unfortunately,
Shi et al. showed that LTX is not secure. An adversary can
easily obtain the private key of a user by a ciphertext.
Recently, Li et al. proposed a new COOSC scheme (here-
after called LZZ). However, both LTX and LZZ need a
point multiplication operation in the online phase, which is
not suitable for resource-constrained devices. To overcome
this weakness, we propose a new COOSC scheme and
prove its security in the random oracle model. In addition,
we analyze the performance of our scheme and show its
application in the IoT.
Keywords Internet of Things  Security  Signcryption 
Certificateless cryptosystem
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging network
paradigm that aims to get the interactions among pervasive
things through heterogeneous networks [1, 2]. The perva-
sive things (e.g. human beings, computers, appliances and
cars) can communicate with each other at any time, any
place, and in any way. Many information technologies
serve as the building blocks of the IoT, such as radio fre-
quency identification (RFID), wireless sensor networks
(WSNs), machine-to-machine interfaces (M2M), cloud
computing, and so on [3]. The IoT has been widely applied
in the smart grid, intelligent transportation, and smart city.
The security task to the IoT is challenging because of the
scalability, heterogeneity, open nature of wireless com-
munication and limited resources of WSNs and RFID [4].
Luo et al. [5] proposed a certificateless online/offline
signcryption (COOSC) scheme (hereafter called LTX) and
designed a secure communication model using the COOSC
scheme. The COOSC has the following two advantages:
(1) it simultaneously achieves confidentiality and authen-
tication at a low cost; (2) it has neither public key certifi-
cates nor key escrow problem. Unfortunately, Shi et al. [6]
showed that LTX is not secure. An adversary can easily
obtain the private key of a user by a ciphertext. Recently,
Li et al. [7] gave a new COOSC scheme (hereafter called
LZZ). However, both LTX and LZZ need a point multi-
plication operation in the online phase, which is not suit-
able for resource-constrained devices.
1.1 Motivation and contribution
To overcome the weakness that needs a point multiplica-
tion operation in the online phase of LTX and LZZ, we
propose a new COOSC scheme. Using the random oracle
model, we prove that our scheme has the indistinguisha-
bility against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-
CCA2) under q-bilinear Diffie–Hellman inversion (q-
BDHI) and modified bilinear inverse Diffie–Hellman
(mBIDH) problems and has the existential unforgeability
against adaptive chosen messages attack (EUF-CMA)
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under q-strong Diffie–Hellman (q-SDH) and modified
inverse computational Diffie–Hellman (mICDH) problems.
Compared with LTX and LZZ, our scheme has no point
multiplication operation in the online phase. In the
unsigncryption phase, our scheme has less computational
cost than LTX and LZZ. For the ciphertext size and private
key size, our scheme is also shorter than LTX and LZZ. We
analyze the performance of our scheme and show its
application in the IoT.
1.2 Related work
Signcryption [8] is a cryptographic primitive that performs
both the functions of digital signature and public key
encryption in a logical single step, at a cost significantly
lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-
encryption method. Signcryption is very suitable for
resource-constrained devices since it simultaneously
achieves confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation at a lower cost.
In a public key cryptosystem, there exist three methods
for the authenticity of a public key, public key infras-
tructure (PKI), identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) and
certificateless cryptosystem (CLC). According to the three
public key authentication methods, signcryption can be
divided into three types: PKI-based signcryption, identity-
based signcryption (IBSC) and certificateless signcryption
(CLSC). In the PKI, a certificate authority (CA) issues a
certificate that binds a public key and the identity of a user
by the signature of the CA. The expired certificates are
issued by a certificate revocation list (CRL). The PKI has
been widely used in the Internet security. Some famous
signcryption schemes in the PKI have been proposed [8,
9]. However, the PKI may not be a good choice for
resource-constrained devices since the certificates man-
agement is heavy, including distribution, verification,
storage and revocation. To reduce the burden of the cer-
tificates management, some IBSC schemes were proposed
[10–13]. Compared with the PKI, the main advantage of
the IBC is the elimination of public key certificates. In the
IBC, a user’s public key is derived directly from its
identity information, such as telephone numbers, email
addresses and IP addresses. There is a trusted third party
called private key generator (PKG) who takes charge of
generating a private key for each user using a master secret
key. Authenticity of a public key is explicitly verified
without requiring a public key certificate. However, the
IBC has a weakness called key escrow problem since the
PKG holds all the users’ private keys. To overcome this
problem, some CLSC schemes were proposed [14–16].
The CLC uses a trusted third party called the key gener-
ating center (KGC) who takes charge of generating a
partial private key for each user using a master secret key.
Then the user generates a secret value and combines the
secret value with the partial private key to form a full
private key. Note that the KGC does not know the full
private key since it does not know the secret value.
Therefore, the CLC has neither public key certificates nor
key escrow problem.
In 2002, An et al. introduced a new notion called online/
offline signcryption (OOSC) by combining the concepts of
online/offline signature and signcryption together [17].
A OOSC scheme splits the signcryption into two phases:
offline phase and online phase. In the offline phase, most
heavy operations are done without the knowledge of a
message. In the online phase, only light operations are done
when the message is available. OOSC is very suitable to
supply the security solution for resource-constrained
devices such as sensor nodes, RFID, smart cards and
mobile phones. A resource-constrained device is charac-
terized by low computational power and limited battery
lifetime and capacity. It can be loaded with the precom-
puted result of the offline phase from a more powerful
device. The entire signcryption process can be finished
quickly using the precomputed result. Some PKI-based
OOSC schemes are proposed [18–20]. Sun et al. [21]
proposed an identity-based online/offline signcryption
(IBOOSC) scheme. However, this scheme needs a recei-
ver’s identity in the offline phase. To overcome this
weakness, Liu et al. [22] proposed a new IBOOSC
scheme that does not need a receiver’s identity in the off-
line stage. Li et al. [23] gave a new IBOOSC that has the
great advantage in the offline storage and ciphertext length.
Li and Xiong [24] proposed a heterogeneous OOSC to
secure the communication of the IoT. In the heterogeneous
OOSC, the sender belongs to the IBC and the receiver
belongs to the PKI. Senthil kumaran and Ilango [25] used
the heterogeneous OOSC to design a secure routing in the
WSNs.
Recently, the COOSC is considered in [5–7]. However,
these schemes need a point multiplication operation in the
online phase. We know that the aim of online/offline
technique is to shift the heavy operations to the offline
phase. Therefore, [5–7] violate this object. In this paper, we
give a new COOSC scheme that removes all heavy oper-
ations in the online phase.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The bilinear
pairings and security assumptions are introduced in Sect. 2.
The formal model of COOSC is given in Sect. 3. We
describe a new COOSC scheme in Sect. 4. We give the
security and performance of our scheme in Sect. 5. The
application of our scheme in the IoT is described in Sect. 6.
Finally, the conclusions are given in Sect. 7.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the bilinear pairings and
security assumptions.
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups with same prime
order p. G1 is an additive group and G2 is a multiplicative
group. Let P be a generator of G1. A bilinear pairing is a
map e^ : G1  G1 ! G2 that satisfies the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity e^ðaP; bQÞ ¼ e^ðP;QÞab for all P;Q 2 G1,
a; b 2 Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy there are P;Q 2 G1 such that
e^ðP;QÞ 6¼ 1, where 1 is the identity element of group
G2.
3. Computability e^ðP;QÞ can be efficiently computed for
all P,Q 2 G1.
The modified Weil pairing and Tate pairing provide
admissible maps of this kind. Please refer to [26] for
details. The security of our scheme depends on the hard-
ness of the following assumptions.
Definition 1 Given groups G1 and G2 of the same prime
order p, a generator P of G1 and a bilinear map
e^ : G1  G1 ! G2, q-bilinear Diffie–Hellman inversion (q-
BDHI) problem in ðG1;G2; e^Þ is to compute e^ðP;PÞ1=a
given ðP; aP; a2P; . . .; aqPÞ. Here a 2 Zp.
Definition 2 Given groups G1 and G2 of the same prime
order p, a generator P of G1 and a bilinear map
e^ : G1  G1 ! G2, the modified bilinear inverse Diffie–
Hellman (mBIDH) problem in ðG1;G2; e^Þ is to compute
e^ðP;PÞ1=ðaþcÞ given ðP; aP; cÞ. Here a; c 2 Zp.
Definition 3 Given groups G1 and G2 of the same prime
order p, a generator P of G1 and a bilinear map
e^ : G1  G1 ! G2, the q-strong Diffie–Hellman (q-SDH)
problem in ðG1;G2; e^Þ is to find a pair ðw; 1aþw PÞ 2 Zp 
G1 given ðP; aP; a2P; . . .; aqPÞ. Here a 2 Zp.
Definition 4 Given a group G1 of prime order p and a
generator P of G1, the modified inverse computational
Diffie–Hellman (mICDH) problem in G1 is to compute
ðaþ cÞ1P given ðP; aP; cÞ. Here a; c 2 Zp.
3 Certificateless online/offline signcryption
COOSC is an online/offline signcryption scheme in the
certificateless cryptosystem. In such a scheme, the sign-
cryption process is split into two phases: offline phase and
online phase. In the offline phase, most heavy crypto-
graphic operations are done without the knowledge of a
message. In the online phase, only light cryptographic
operations are done when the message is available. Now
we give the formal definition and security notions of the
COOSC.
3.1 Syntax
A generic COOSC scheme consists of the following seven
algorithms [5, 7].
Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a KGC that
takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs a master
secret key s and the system parameters params that con-
tains a master public key Ppub. For simplicity, we omit
params in the other algorithms in the following content.
PPKE is a partial private key extraction algorithm run
by the KGC that takes as input a user’s identity ID and a
master secret key s, and outputs a partial private key DID.
UKG is a user key generation algorithm run by a user
that takes as input an identity ID, and outputs a secret value
xID and a public key PKID. The public key can be published
without a certificate.
FPKS is a full private key setup algorithm run by a user
that takes as input a partial private key DID and a secret
value xID, and outputs a full private key SID.
OffSC is a probabilistic offline signcryption algorithm
run by a sender that takes as input a sender’s private key SA
and a receiver’s identity IDB and public key PKB, and
outputs an offline signcryption result d. Note that a mes-
sage is not required in this phase.
OnSC is an online signcryption algorithm run by a
sender that takes as input a message m, an offline sign-
cryption d and a sender’s identity IDA and public key PKA,
and outputs a ciphertext r.
USC is a deterministic unsigncryption algorithm run by
a receiver that takes as input a ciphertext r, a sender’s
identity IDA and public key PKA, and a receiver’s private
key SB, and outputs a message m or a failure symbol ? if r
is not a valid ciphertext between the sender and the
receiver.
The above algorithms should satisfy the consistency
constraint of the COOSC, i.e. if
d ¼ OffSCðSA; IDB;PKBÞ; r ¼ OnSCðm; d; IDA;PKAÞ
then we have
m ¼ USCðr; IDA;PKA; SBÞ:
3.2 Security notions
In the CLC, we need consider two types of adversaries
[26], Type I and Type II. A Type I adversary models an
attacker that is a common user and does not have the
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KGC’s master secret key. But it can adaptively replace a
user’ public key with a selected valid public key. A Type II
adversary models an honest-but-curious KGC who knows
the master secret key. But it can not replace a user’s public
key. In addition, a signcryption scheme should satisfy
confidentiality [i.e. indistinguishability against adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2)] and unforgeability
[i.e. existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen
messages attack (EUF-CMA)] [14]. So, in the CLSC, we
should consider four security notions, IND-CCA2-I for a
Type I adversary, IND-CCA2-II for a Type II adversary,
EUF-CMA-I for a Type I adversary and EUF-CMA-II for a
Type II adversary. The four games for the four security
notions are described as follows [5, 7].
The first game (Game-I) is a confidentiality game played
between a Type I adversary AI and a challenger C.
Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter
k and gives the system parameters params to AI .
Phase 1 AI performs a polynomially bounded number of
queries in an adaptive manner (i.e., each query may depend
on the answer to the previous queries).
• Partial private key extraction queries AI submits an
identity ID to C. C runs PPKE algorithm and sends a
partial private key DID to AI .
• Private key queriesAI submits an identity ID to C. C runs
FPKS algorithm and gives a full private key SID to AI (C
may first run PPKE and UKG algorithms if necessary).
• Public key queries AI may ask a public key query by
submitting an identity ID. C runs UKG algorithm and
sends a public key PKID to AI .
• Public key replacement queries AI can replace a public
key PKID with a selected value.
• Signcryption queries AI may ask a signcryption query
by submitting a message m, a sender’s identity IDi and
a receiver’s identity IDj. C first runs FPKS algorithm to
get the sender’s private key Si and UKG algorithm to
get the sender’s public key PKi and the receiver’s
public key PKj. Then C runs OffSCðSi; IDj;PKjÞ to
obtain the offline signcryption d. Finally, C sends the
result of algorithm OnSCðm; d; IDi;PKiÞ to AI . If the
public key associated with IDi has been replaced, C
does not know the sender’s secret value. In this case,
we require AI to supply it.
• Unsigncryption queries AI may ask an unsigncryption
query by submitting a ciphertext r, a sender’s identity
IDi and a receiver’s identity IDj. C first runs FPKS
algorithm to get the receiver’s private key Sj and UKG
algorithm to get the sender’s public key PKi. Then C
sends the result of algorithm USC ðr; IDi;PKi; SjÞ to
AI . If the public key associated with IDj has been
replaced, C does not know the receiver’s secret value.
In this case, we require AI to supply it.
Challenge AI decides when phase 1 ends. AI outputs two
equal length messages ðm0;m1Þ, a sender’s identity IDA
and a receiver’s identity IDB on which it wishes to be
challenged. Note that IDB can not be submitted to a private
key query in phase 1. IDB also can not be submitted to both
a partial private key extraction query and a public key
replacement query. C chooses a random bit b 2 f0; 1g,
computes d ¼ OffSCðSA; IDB;PKBÞ and the challenge
ciphertext r ¼ OnSCðmb; d; IDA;PKAÞ which is sent to
AI . If the public key associated with IDA has been
replaced, C may not know the sender’s secret value. In this
case, we require AI to supply it.
Phase 2 AI may ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in the phase 1. This time, AI
can not ask a private key query on IDB. AI also can not ask
a partial private key extraction query on IDB if the public
key of this identity has been replaced before the challenge
phase. In addition, it can not ask an unsigncryption query
on ðr; IDA; IDBÞ to obtain the corresponding message
unless the public key PKA or PKB has been replaced after
the challenge phase.
Guess AI outputs a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 ¼ b.
The advantage of AI is defined as AdvðAÞ ¼ j2Pr½b0 ¼
b  1j, where Pr½b0 ¼ b is the probability that b0 ¼ b.
Definition 5 A COOSC scheme is ð; t; qppk; qsk;
qpk; qpkr; qs; quÞ-IND-CCA2-I secure if there does not exist
a probabilistic t-polynomial time adversary AI that has
advantage at least  after at most qppk partial private key
extraction queries, qsk private key queries, qpk public key
queries, qpkr public key replacement queries, qs signcryp-
tion queries and qu unsigncryption queries in the Game-I.
The second game (Game-II) is a confidentiality game
played between a Type II adversary AII and a challenger C.
Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter
k and gives a master secret key s and the system parameters
params to AII .
Phase 1 AII makes a polynomially bounded number of
private key queries, public key queries, signcryption
queries and unsigncryption queries just like in the Game-I.
Note that the partial private key extraction queries is not
needed since AII can do it by itself.
Challenge AII decides when phase 1 ends. AII outputs
two equal length messages ðm0;m1Þ, a sender’s identity
IDA and a receiver’s identity IDB on which it wishes to be
challenged. Note that IDB can not be submitted to a private
key query in phase 1. C chooses a random bit b 2 f0; 1g,
computes d ¼ OffSCðSA; IDB;PKBÞ and r ¼ OnSCðmb;
d; IDA;PKAÞ, and sends r to AII .
Phase 2 AII may ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in the phase 1. This time, AII
can not ask a private key query on IDB. In addition, it can
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not make an unsigncryption query on ðr; IDA; IDBÞ to
obtain the corresponding message.
Guess AII outputs a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 ¼ b.
The advantage of AII is defined as AdvðAÞ ¼
j2Pr½b0 ¼ b  1j, where Pr½b0 ¼ b is the probability that
b0 ¼ b.
Definition 6 A COOSC scheme is ð; t; qsk; qpk; qs; quÞ-
IND-CCA2-II secure if there does not exist a probabilistic
t-polynomial time adversary AII that has advantage at least
 after at most qsk private key queries, qpk public key
queries, qs signcryption queries and qu unsigncryption
queries in the Game-II.
Definition 7 A COOSC scheme is said to be IND-CCA2
secure if it is both IND-CCA2-I secure and IND-CCA2-II
secure.
The Game-I and Game-II catch the insider security for
confidentiality since the adversary knows all senders’ pri-
vate keys [17]. The insider security ensures the forward
security of a signcryption scheme. That is, the confiden-
tiality is still kept if the sender’s private key is disclosed.
The third game (Game-III) is an unforgeability game
played between a Type I adversary F I and a challenger C.
Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter
k and gives the system parameters params to F I .
Attack F I performs a polynomially bounded number of
queries just like in the Game-I.
Forgery F I outputs a ciphertext r, a sender’s identity
IDA and a receiver’s identity IDB. F I wins this game if the
following conditions hold:
1. USC ðr; IDA;PKA; SBÞ ¼ m.
2. F I has not asked a private key query for IDA.
3. F I has not asked both a public key replacement query
for IDA and a partial private key extraction query for
IDA.
4. F I has not asked a signcryption query on
ðm; IDA; IDBÞ.
The advantage of F I is defined as the probability that it
wins.
Definition 8 A COOSC scheme is ð; t; qppk; qsk; qpk;
qpkr; qs; quÞ-EUF-CMA-I secure if there does not exist a
probabilistic t-polynomial time adversary F I that has
advantage at least  after at most qppk partial private key
extraction queries, qsk private key queries, qpk public
key queries, qpkr public key replacement queries, qs sign-
cryption queries and qu unsigncryption queries in the
Game-III.
The fourth game (Game-IV) is an unforgeability game
played between a Type II adversary F II and a challenger C.
Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter
k and gives a master secret key s and the system parameters
params to F II .
Attack F II performs a polynomially bounded number of
queries just like in the Game-II.
Forgery F II outputs a ciphertext r, a sender’s identity
IDA and a receiver’s identity IDB. F II wins this game if the
following conditions hold:
1. USC ðr; IDA;PKA; SBÞ ¼ m.
2. F II has not asked a private key query for IDA.
3. F II has not asked a signcryption query on
ðm; IDA; IDBÞ.
The advantage of F II is defined as the probability that it
succeeds.
Definition 9 A COOSC scheme is ð; t; qsk; qpk; qs; quÞ-
EUF-CMA-II secure if there does not exist a probabilistic
t-polynomial time adversary F II that has advantage at least
 after at most qsk private key queries, qpk public key
queries, qs signcryption queries and qu unsigncryption
queries in the Game-IV.
Definition 10 A COOSC scheme is EUF-CMA secure if
it is both EUF-CMA-I secure and EUF-CMA-II secure.
In the Game-III and Game-IV, the adversary is allowed
to know the receiver’s private key SB. The insider security
for unforgeability is obtained [17].
4 An efficient COOSC scheme
In this section, we propose an efficient COOSC scheme.
Here we assume that the sender’s identity is IDA and the
receiver’s identity is IDB.
Setup given a security parameter k, the KGC chooses an
additive group G1 and a multiplicative G2 of the same prime
order p, a generator P of G1, a bilinear map e^ : G1
G1 ! G2, and four hash functions H1 : f0; 1g ! Zp,
H2 : G1 ! Zp, H3 : G2 ! f0; 1gn and H4 : f0; 1gn
f0; 1g  G1  G2  G1 ! Zp. Here n is the number of bits
of a message to be sent. The KGC randomly selects a master
secret key s 2 Zp and computes the master public key
Ppub ¼ sP. The KGC publishes the system parameters
fG1;G2; p; e^; n;P;Ppub; g;H1;H2;H3;H4g
and keeps s secret. Here g ¼ e^ðP;PÞ.
PPKE a user sends its identity IDU to the KGC. The
KGC computes a partial private key
DU ¼ 1
H1ðIDUÞ þ s P
Wireless Netw (2017) 23:145–158 149
123
and returns DU to the user.
UKG A user with identity IDU randomly selects xU 2 Zp
as the secret value and sets
PKU ¼ xUðH1ðIDUÞPþ PpubÞ
as the public key. The public key can be published without
certification.
FPKS Given a partial private key DU and a secret value
xU , the user sets a full private key
SU ¼ 1
xU þ H2ðPKUÞDU :
OffSC Given a sender’s private key SA and a receiver’s
identity IDB and public key PKB, this algorithm works as
follows.
1. Choose x; a from Zp randomly.
2. Compute r ¼ gx.
3. Compute S0 ¼ aSA.
4. Compute T ¼ xðPKB þ H2ðPKBÞðH1ðIDBÞPþ PpubÞÞ.
5. Output a offline signcryption d ¼ ðx; a1; r; S0; TÞ.
OnSC given a message m, a offline signcryption d and a
sender’s identity IDA and public key PKA, this algorithm
works as follows.
1. Compute c ¼ m H3ðrÞ.
2. Compute h ¼ H4ðm; IDA;PKA; r; S0Þ.
3. Compute h ¼ ðxþ hÞa1 mod p.
4. Output a ciphertext r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ.
USC given a ciphertext r, a sender’s identity IDA and
public key PKA, and a receiver’s private key SB, this
algorithm works as follows.
1. Compute r ¼ e^ðT ; SBÞ.
2. Recover m ¼ c H3ðrÞ.
3. Compute h ¼ H4ðm; IDA;PKA; r; S0Þ.
4. Compute S ¼ hS0.
5. Accept the message if and only if
r ¼ e^ðS;PKA þ H2ðPKAÞðH1ðIDAÞPþ PpubÞÞgh;
return ? otherwise.
We summarize the communication process in Fig 1.
Now we check the consistency of our scheme. First,
because
T ¼ xðPKB þ H2ðPKBÞðH1ðIDBÞPþ PpubÞÞ;
we have Eq. (1).
e^ðT ; SBÞ ¼ e^ðxðPKB þ H2ðPKBÞðH1ðIDBÞPþ PpubÞÞ; SBÞ











S ¼ hS0 ¼ ðxþ hÞa1aSA ¼ ðxþ hÞSA;
we have Eq. (2).
e^ðS;PKA þ H2ðPKAÞðH1ðIDAÞPþ PpubÞÞgh
¼ e^ððxþ hÞSA; ðxA þ H2ðPKAÞÞðH1ðIDAÞ þ sÞPÞgh











c = m ⊕ H3(r)
h = H4(m, IDA, PKA, r, S )
θ = (x+ h)α−1 mod p
σ = (c, θ, S , T )
σ,IDA,PKA
r = eˆ(T, SB)
m = c ⊕ H3(r)
h = H4(m, IDA, PKA, r, S )
S = θS
r
?= eˆ(S, PKA +H2(PKA)(H1(IDA)P + Ppub))g−h
Fig. 1 Certificateless online/
offline signcryption
communication
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5 Analysis of the scheme
In this section, we analyze the security and performance of
our scheme.
5.1 Security
Theorem 1 In the random oracle model, our scheme is
IND-CCA2 secure under the q-BDHI and mBIDH
assumptions.
Proof This theorem follows from the following Lemmas
1 and 2. h
Lemma 1 In the random oracle model, if there is an
adversary AI that has a non-negligible advantage  against
the IND-CCA2-I security of our scheme when running in a
time t and performing qppk partial private key extraction
queries, qsk private key queries, qpk public key queries, qpkr
public key replacement queries, qs signcryption queries, qu
unsigncryption queries and qHi queries to oracles Hi
(i ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4), then we can construct an algorithm C that










in a time t0 	 t þ Oðqs þ quÞtp þ Oðq2H1Þtm þ OðquqH4Þte,
where tp is the cost for one pairing operation, tm is the cost
for a point multiplication operation in G1 and te is the cost
for an exponentiation operation in G2.
Proof We show how C can use AI as a subroutine to solve
a random instance ðP; aP; a2P; . . .; aqPÞ of the q-BDHI
problem.
Initial in a preparation phase, C chooses ‘ 2 f1; . . .;
qH1g, elements e‘ 2 Zp and w1; . . .;w‘1;w‘þ1;wq 2 Zp
randomly. For i ¼ 1; . . .; ‘ 1; ‘þ 1; . . .; q, C sets
ei ¼ e‘  wi. Then C uses its input to set a generator Q 2
G1 and an element X ¼ aQ 2 G1 such that it knows q 1
pairs ðwi;Vi ¼ 1aþwi QÞ for i 2 f1; . . .; qgnf‘g as in [27]. To


















cj1ðajPÞ ¼ af ðaÞP ¼ aQ:
As in [27], the pairs ðwi;ViÞ for i 2 f1; . . .; qgnf‘g can be
gotten by expanding










djðajPÞ ¼ fiðaÞP ¼ f ðaÞaþ wi P ¼
1
aþ wi Q:
The master public key of the KGC is set as Qpub ¼
X  e‘Q ¼ ða e‘ÞQ and its corresponding master
secret key is implicitly set to s ¼ a e‘ 2 Zp. For all
i 2 f1; . . .; qgnf‘g, we have ðei;ViÞ ¼ ðei; 1eiþs QÞ. C gives
AI the system parameters with Q, Qpub ¼ ða e‘ÞQ and
g ¼ e^ðQ;QÞ.
Phase 1 C simulates AI’s challenger in the Game-I. C
keeps four lists L1, L2, L3 and L4 to simulate oracles H1,
H2, H3 and H4, respectively. C should maintain the
consistency and avoid collision for these answers. In
addition, C maintains a list Lk that is initially empty to keep
the public key information. We assume that H1 queries are
different, that AI will ask H1ðIDÞ before ID is used in the
other queries and that the target identity IDB is submitted to
H1 at some point. In addition, we suppose that the sender’s
identity is different to the receiver’s identity by irreflexivity
assumption [10].
• H1 queries: These queries are indexed by a counter m
that is initially set to 1. For a H1ðIDmÞ query, C returns
em as the answer, inserts ðIDm; emÞ into the list L1 and
increments m.
• H2 queries: For a H2ðPKiÞ query, C checks if the value
of H2 has been defined for the PKi. If yes, C returns
previously defined value. Otherwise, C returns a
random h2;i 2 Zp to AI and inserts ðPKi; h2;iÞ into the
list L2.
• H3 queries: For a H3ðriÞ query, C checks if the value of
H3 has been defined for the same input. If yes, C returns
previously defined value. Otherwise, C returns a
random h3;i 2 f0; 1gn to AI and inserts ðri; h3;iÞ into
the list L3.
• H4 queries: For a H4ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0iÞ query, C checks
if the value of H4 has been defined for the same input. If
yes, C returns the previously defined value. Otherwise,
C returns a random h4;i 2 Zp to AI . In addition, to
answer the following queries, C simulates H3 oracle to
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get h3;i ¼ H3ðriÞ 2 f0; 1gn and sets ci ¼ mi  h3;i and
ni ¼ ri  e^ðQ;QÞh4;i . Finally, C inserts the tuple
ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; ci; niÞ into the list L4.
• Partial private key extraction queries AI can ask a
partial private key extraction query by submitting an
identity IDi. If i ¼ ‘, then C fails and stops. Otherwise,
C knows that H1ðIDiÞ ¼ ei and returns Vi ¼ 1eiþs Q to
AI .
• Private key queries AI can ask a private key query by
submitting an identity IDi. If i ¼ ‘, then C fails and
stops. Otherwise, C knows the partial private key
Vi ¼ 1eiþs Q. Then C searches the list Lk for the entry
ðIDi;PKi; xiÞ (C generates a new key pair information if
this entry does not exist) and returns Si ¼  1xiþh2;i Vi.
• Public key queries AI chooses an identity IDi and sends
it to C. If the list Lk has a tuple ðIDi;PKi; xiÞ, then C
gives PKi to AI . Otherwise, C selects a random number
xi 2 Zp, sets PKi ¼ xiðeiQþ QpubÞ, inserts
ðIDi;PKi; xiÞ into the list Lk, and gives PKi to AI .
• Public key replacement queries for a public key
replacement query for ðIDi;PKiÞ, C updates the list Lk
with tuple ðIDi;PKi;?Þ. Here ? denotes an unknown
value.
• Signcryption queries AI can ask a signcryption query
by submitting a message m, a sender’s identity IDi and
a receiver’s identity IDj. If i 6¼ ‘, C knows the sender’s
private key Si and can answer this query according to
the steps of OffSC and OnSC algorithms. If i ¼ ‘ but
j 6¼ ‘ by the irreflexivity assumption [10], C knows the
receiver’s private key Sj. To answer this query, C first
randomly chooses h; g; h 2 Zp, computes S0 ¼ h1gSj,
T¼gðPK‘þh2;‘ðe‘QþQpubÞÞhðPKjþh2;jðejQþ QpubÞÞ
and r¼e^ðT ;SjÞ. Then C defines the hash value
H4ðm;ID‘;PK‘;r;S0Þ to h. Finally, C computes c¼m
H3ðrÞ and returns r¼ðc;h;S0;TÞ to AI . C fails if H4 is
already defined but this only happens with probability
ðqsþqH4Þ=2k.
• Unsigncryption queries AI can ask an unsigncryption
query by submitting a ciphertext r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ, a
sender’s identity IDi and a receiver’s identity IDj. If
j 6¼ ‘, C knows the receiver’s private key Sj and can
answer this query according to the steps of USC
algorithm. If j ¼ ‘, C knows the sender’s private key Si
since i 6¼ ‘ by the irreflexivity assumption [10]. For all
valid ciphertexts, we have
logSiðhS0  hSiÞ ¼ logPK‘þh2;‘ðe‘QþQpubÞT;
where h ¼ H4ðm; IDi;PKi; r; S0Þ. So the following
equation
e^ðT; SiÞ ¼ e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Qþ QpubÞ; hS0  hSiÞ
holds. C first computes n ¼ e^ðhS0;PKi þ h2;iðeiQþ
QpubÞÞ and then searches the list L4 for the entries of the
form ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; c; nÞ indexed by
i 2 f1; . . .; qH4g. If there is no such an entry, r is
rejected. Otherwise, C further checks whether the fol-
lowing equation holds for the corresponding indexes
e^ðT; SiÞ
e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Qþ QpubÞ; hS0Þ
¼ e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Qþ QpubÞ; SiÞh4;i :
If the unique i 2 f1; . . .; qH4g that satisfies this above
equation is found, C returns the matching message mi.
Otherwise, r is also rejected. For all unsigncryption
queries, the probability to reject a valid ciphertext is
less than or equal to qu
2k
.
Challenge AI generates two equal length messages
ðm0;m1Þ, a sender’s identity IDA and a receiver’s identity
IDB on which it hopes to be challenged. If IDB 6¼ ID‘, C
fails. Otherwise, C chooses c 2 f0; 1gn, k; h 2 Zp, S0 2
G1 randomly and sets T
 ¼ kxBQ kh2;BQ. C returns a
ciphertext r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ to AI . If we define q ¼ k=a
and since s ¼ a e‘, we have
T ¼ kxBQ kh2;BQ
¼ qaxBQ qah2;BQ
¼ ðeB þ sÞqxBQþ ðeB þ sÞqh2;BQ
¼ qxBðeBQþ QpubÞ þ qh2;BðeBQþ QpubÞ
¼ qPKB þ qh2;BðeBQþ QpubÞ
¼ qðPKB þ h2;BðeBQþ QpubÞÞ:
AI cannot identify that r is not a valid ciphertext unless it
asks a H3 or H4 query on e^ðQ;QÞq.
Phase 2 AI can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in the phase 1 with the
following limitation: (1) it can not ask a private key query
on IDB; (2) it can not ask a partial private key extraction
query on IDB if the public key of IDB has been replaced
before the challenge phase; (3) it can not ask an unsign-
cryption query on ðr; IDA; IDBÞ to obtain the correspond-
ing message unless the public key PKA or PKB has been
replaced after the challenge phase. C answer AI’s queries
according to the same method as in the phase 1.
Guess AI outputs a guess bit b0 which is ignored by C.
C fetches a random entry ðri; h3;iÞ from the list L3 or
ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; ci; niÞ from the list L4. Since L3
contains no more than qH3 þ qH4 records, the selected entry
will contain the correct element ri ¼ e^ðQ;QÞq ¼
e^ðP;PÞf ðaÞ2k=a with probability 1=ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ. As in [12],
the q-BDHI problem can be solved by noting that, if
n ¼ e^ðP;PÞ1=a, then













This finishes the description of the whole simulation. Now
we analyze C’s advantage. Define the events E1, E2, E3, E4
and E5 as
E1: AI has not chosen ID‘ as the receiver’s identity in
the challenge phase.
E2: AI has asked a private key query on ID‘.
E3: AI has asked a partial private key extraction query
on ID‘ and the public key of ID‘ has been replaced before
the challenge phase.
E4: C aborts in a signcryption query because of a
collision on H4.
E5: C aborts in an unsigncryption query because of
rejecting a valid ciphertext.
According to above analysis, we know that the proba-
bility of C not aborting is
Pr½:abort ¼ Pr½:E1 ^ :E2 ^ :E3 ^ :E4 ^ :E5:
We know that Pr½:E1 ¼ 1=qH1 , Pr½E4 	 qsðqs þ qH4Þ=2k
and Pr½E5 	 qu=2k. In addition, we know that :E1 implies
:E2 and :E3. So we have
Pr½:abort  1
qH1







In addition, C chooses the correct element from the list L3
or L4 with probability 1=ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ. Therefore, we have
0  
qH1ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ







The bound on C’s computation time is obtained from the
fact that C needs Oðq2H1Þ point multiplication operations in
G1 in the preparation phase, Oðqs þ quÞ pairing operations
and OðquqH4Þ exponentiation operations in G2 in the
signcryption and unsigncryption queries. h
Lemma 2 In the random oracle model, if there is an
adversary AII that has a non-negligible advantage  against
the IND-CCA2-II security of our scheme when running in a
time t and performing qsk private key queries, qpk public
key queries, qs signcryption queries, qu unsigncryption
queries and qHi queries to oracles Hi (i ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4), then
we can construct an algorithm C that can solve the mBIDH
problem with an advantage
0  
qH1ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ






in a time t0 	 t þ Oðqs þ quÞtp þ OðquqH4Þte, where tp is the
cost for one pairing operation and te is the cost for an
exponentiation operation in G2.
Proof We show how C can use AII as a subroutine to
solve a random instance ðP; aP; cÞ of the mBIDH problem.
Initial C gives AII a master secret key s and the system
parameters params with Ppub ¼ sP. Here s is randomly
chosen by C.
Phase 1 C simulates AII’s challenger in the Game-II. C
maintains four lists L1, L2, L3 and L4 to simulate oracles
H1, H2, H3 and H4, respectively. C should keep the
consistency and avoid collision for these answers. In
addition, C keeps a list Lk that is initially empty to maintain
the public key information. We suppose that H1 queries are
different and that AII will ask H1ðIDÞ before ID is used in
the other queries. In addition, we suppose that the sender’s
identity is different to the receiver’s identity by irreflexivity
assumption [10]. C chooses a random number ‘ 2
f1; 2; . . .; qH1g and answers AII’s queries as follows.
• H1queries For each new IDi, C randomly selects
ei 2 Zp, inserts ðIDi; eiÞ into the list L1 and answers
H1ðIDiÞ ¼ ei.
• H2queries For a H2ðPKiÞ query, C checks if the value of
H2 has been defined for the same input. If yes, C returns
previously defined value. Otherwise, C checks if PKi ¼
eiaPþ saP (i.e., i ¼ ‘). If yes, C returns h2;‘ ¼ c and
inserts ðPK‘; cÞ into the list L2. If no, C selects a random
h2;i from Z

p, returns h2;i as an answer and inserts
ðPKi; h2;iÞ into the list L2.
• H3 queries: For a H3ðriÞ query, C checks if the value of
H3 has been defined for the same input. If yes, C returns
previously defined value. Otherwise, C selects a random
h3;i from f0; 1gn, returns h3;i as an answer and inserts
ðri; h3;iÞ into the list L3.
• H4 queries: For a H4ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0iÞ query, C checks
if the value of H4 has been defined for the same input. If
yes, C gives the previously defined value. Otherwise, C
returns a random h4;i 2 Zp as the answer. In addition, to
answer the following queries, C simulates H3 oracle on
its own to get h3;i ¼ H3ðriÞ 2 f0; 1gn and computes
ci ¼ mi  h3;i and ni ¼ ri  e^ðP;PÞh4;i . Lastly, C inserts
the tuple ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; ci; niÞ into the list L4.
• Private key queries AII can ask a private key query by
submitting an identity IDi. If i ¼ ‘, then C fails and
stops. Otherwise, C runs H1 oracle to get ðIDi; eiÞ. Then
C searches the list Lk for the entry ðIDi;PKi; xiÞ (C
generates a new key pair information if this entry does




ei þ s P:
Here h2;i ¼ H2ðPKiÞ.
• Public key queries AII can ask a public key query by
submitting an identity IDi. If i 6¼ ‘, C selects a random
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xi 2 Zp, sets a public key PKi ¼ xiðeiPþ PpubÞ, inserts
ðIDi;PKi; xiÞ into the list Lk and returns PKi to AII .
Otherwise, C returns PK‘ ¼ e‘aPþ saP and inserts
ðID‘;PK‘;?Þ into the list Lk.
• Signcryption queries AII can ask a signcryption query
by submitting a message m, a sender’s identity IDi and
a receiver’s identity IDj. If i 6¼ ‘, C knows the sender’s
private key Si and can answer this query according to
the steps of OffSC and OnSC algorithms. If i ¼ ‘ but
j 6¼ ‘ by the irreflexivity assumption, C knows the
receiver’s private key Sj. To answer this query, C first
randomly chooses h; g; h 2 Zp and computes
S0 ¼ h1gSj, T ¼ gðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Pþ PpubÞÞ  hðPKj þ
h2;jðejPþ PpubÞÞ and r ¼ e^ðT ; SjÞ. Then C defines the
hash value H4ðm; ID‘;PK‘; r; S0Þ to h. Finally, C
computes c ¼ m H3ðrÞ and returns r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ
to AII . C fails if H4 is already defined but this only
happens with probability ðqs þ qH4Þ=2k.
• Unsigncryption queries AII can make an unsigncryp-
tion query about a ciphertext r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ, a
sender’s identity IDi and a receiver’s identity IDj. If
j 6¼ ‘, then C knows the receiver’s private key Sj and
can answer this query according to the steps of USC
algorithm. If j ¼ ‘, C knows the sender’s private key Si
since i 6¼ ‘ by the irreflexivity assumption. For all valid
ciphertexts, we have
logSiðhS0  hSiÞ ¼ logPK‘þh2;‘ðe‘PþPpubÞT ;
where h ¼ H4ðm; IDi;PKi; r; S0Þ. Therefore, we have
e^ðT; SiÞ ¼ e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Pþ PpubÞ; hS0  hSiÞ:
C first computes n ¼ e^ðhS0;PKi þ h2;iðeiPþ PpubÞÞ
and then searches the list L4 for the entries of
the form ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; c; nÞ indexed by
i 2 f1; . . .; qH4g. If there is no such an entry, r is
rejected. Otherwise, C further checks whether the fol-
lowing equation holds for the corresponding indexes
e^ðT ; SiÞ
e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Pþ PpubÞ; hS0Þ
¼ e^ðPK‘ þ h2;‘ðe‘Pþ PpubÞ; SiÞh4;i
If the unique i 2 f1; . . .; qH4g that satisfies this above
equation is found, then C returns the matching message
mi. Otherwise, r is also rejected. For all unsigncryption
queries, the probability to reject a valid ciphertext is
less than or equal to qu
2k
.
Challenge AII generates two equal length messages
ðm0;m1Þ, a sender’s identity IDA and a receiver’s identity
IDB on which it hopes to be challenged. If IDB 6¼ ID‘, C
fails. Otherwise C randomly chooses c 2 f0; 1gn,
k; h 2 Zp, S0 2 G1 and sets T ¼ kP. C returns the
ciphertext r ¼ ðc; h; S0; TÞ to AII . AII cannot identify
that r is not a valid ciphertext unless it makes a H3 or H4
query on e^ðT; SBÞ.
Phase 2 AII can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in the phase 1 with the
limitation: (1) it can not ask a private key query on IDB; (2)
it can not ask an unsigncryption query on ðr; IDA; IDBÞ to
obtain the corresponding message. C answer AII’s queries
according to the same method as in the phase 1.
Guess AII produces a bit b0 which is ignored by C.
C fetches a random entry ðri; h3;iÞ from the list L3 or
ðmi; IDi;PKi; ri; S0i; h4;i; ci; niÞ from the list L4. Since the list
L3 includes no more than qH3 þ qH4 records, the chosen
entry will contain the right element ri ¼ e^ðT; SBÞ with
probability 1=ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ. The mBIDH problem can be
solved by noting that, if
e^ðT; SBÞ ¼ e^ðkP; 1aþ c
1
ei þ s PÞ;
we have




This finishes the description of the whole simulation. Now
we analyze C’s advantage. Define the events E1, E2, E3 and
E4 as
E1: AII does not select ID‘ as the receiver’s identity in
the challenge phase.
E2: AII has asked a private key query on the identity
ID‘.
E3: C aborts in a signcryption query because of a
collision on H4.
E4: C aborts in an unsigncryption query because of
rejecting a valid ciphertext.
According to above analysis, we know that the proba-
bility of C not aborting is
Pr½:abort ¼ Pr½:E1 ^ :E2 ^ :E3 ^ :E4:
From the above analysis, we know that Pr½:E1 ¼ 1=qH1 ,
Pr½E3 	 qsðqs þ qH4Þ=2k and Pr½E4 	 qu=2k. In addition,
we know that :E1 implies :E2. So we have
Pr½:abort  1
qH1







In addition, C chooses the correct element from the list L3
or L4 with probability 1=ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ. Therefore, we have
0  
qH1ðqH3 þ 2qH4Þ







The bound on C’s computation time can be obtained from
the fact that C needs Oðqs þ quÞ pairing operations and
OðquqH4Þ exponentiation operations in G2 in the sign-
cryption and unsigncryption queries. h
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Theorem 2 In the random oracle model, our scheme is
EUF-CMA secure under the q-SDH and mICDH
assumptions.
Proof This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. We
can show that a forger in the EUF-CMA game implies a
forger in a chosen messages and given identity attacks. By
using the forking lemma [28] and the relationship between
given identity attack and chosen identity attack [29], we
can easily finish this proof. h
5.2 Performance
In this section, we compare the computational cost, offline
storage, ciphertext size, private key size and security of our
scheme with those of LTX [5] and LZZ [7] in Table 1. We
denote by M the point multiplication in G1, E the expo-
nentiation in G2 and P the pairing computation. The other
operations are ignored in Table 1 since these operations
take the most running time of the whole algorithm. |x|
denotes the number of bits of x. From Table 1, we know
that both LTX and LZZ need one point multiplication in
the OnSC algorithm. However, our scheme does not need
any point multiplication, exponentiation or pairing opera-
tion in the OnSC algorithm. In addition, our scheme has
less computational cost than LTX and LZZ in the USC
algorithm. For the OffSC algorithm, the computational cost
of our scheme is slightly higher than LTX and is lower than
LZZ. For the offline storage, our scheme is slightly larger
than LTX and is smaller than LZZ. For the ciphertext size
and private key size, our scheme is shortest among the
three schemes. Note that LTX was showed insecure in [6].
We give a quantitative analysis for offline storage,
ciphertext size and private key size. We use PBC Type A
pairing [30] in this analysis. The Type A pairing is con-
structed on the curve
y2 
 ðx3 þ xÞ mod q
for some prime q 
 3 mod 4, where the embedding degree
is 2 and the order of G1 is p. In this analysis, we use three
kinds of parameters that represents 80-bit, 112-bit and
128-bit AES [31] key size security level, respectively.
Table 2 gives the specification for different security level
of this analysis.
We assume that the size of a message is jmj ¼ 160 bits.
When we adopt the 80-bit security level, the size of q is
512 bits. So the size of an element in group G1 is 1024 bits
using an elliptic curve with 160 bits p. By standard com-
pression technique [32], the size of an element in group G1
can be reduced to 65 bytes. The size of an element in G2 is
1024 bits. So, the offline storage of LTX, LZZ and
our scheme are jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jG2j bits ¼ 20 þ 2  65þ
128 bytes ¼ 278 bytes, 3jZpj þ 4jG1j þ jG2j bits ¼ 3
20 þ 4  65 þ 128 bytes ¼ 448 bytes and 2jZpj þ 2jG1j þ
jG2j bits ¼ 2  20 þ 2  65 þ 128 bytes ¼ 298 bytes,
respectively. The ciphertext size of LTX, LZZ and our
scheme are 2jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jmj bits ¼ 2  20 þ 2  65þ
20 bytes ¼ 190 bytes, 2jZpj þ 4jG1j þ jmj bits ¼ 2  20 þ
4  65þ 20 bytes ¼ 320 bytes, and jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jmj
bits ¼ 20 þ 2  65 þ 20 bytes ¼ 170 bytes, respectively.
The private key size of LTX, LZZ and our scheme are
jZpj þ jG1j bits ¼ 20 þ 65 bytes ¼ 85 bytes, jZpj þ
jG1j bits ¼ 20 þ 65 bytes ¼ 85 bytes, and jG1j bits ¼ 65
bytes, respectively. We can use the same method to com-
pute the offline storage, ciphertext size and private key size
at the 112-bit security level and 128-bit security level.
We summarize the offline storage, ciphertext size and
private key size of the three schemes at different security
level in Figs. 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
6 Application
In this section, we give an application of our scheme in the
IoT. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are an important
part of the IoT since the WSNs takes charge of collecting
environmental data for the IoT. The WSNs are composed
of a large number of tiny sensor nodes and one or more
Table 2 Specification for different security level of this analysis
(bits)




Table 1 Comparison of existing schemes
Schemes OffSC OnSC USC Offline storage Ciphertext size Private
key
Security
M E P M E P M E P size
LTX [5] 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 0 3 jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jG2j 2jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jmj jZpj þ jG1j No
LZZ [7] 5 1 0 1 0 0 5 1 5 3jZpj þ 4jG1j þ jG2j 2jZpj þ 4jG1j þ jmj jZpj þ jG1j Yes
Ours 4 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 2jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jG2j jZpj þ 2jG1j þ jmj jG1j Yes
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base stations [33, 34]. The base station acts as a gateway
between sensor nodes and users since it typically forwards
data from the WSNs to an Internet server. This commu-
nication from the WSNs to the server should satisfy con-
fidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation.
Without confidentiality, the data may be disclosed to an
adversary. Without authentication, the server can not use
the data since the data may be unbelievable. An adversary
can send wrong data to the server. Without integrity check,
an adversary can modify the transmitted data. Without non-
repudiation, the WSNs may deny the transmitted data when
a dispute happens. Fig. 5 shows a secure communication
model for the IoT using our scheme. This model consists of
three main entities, the WSNs, a service provider (SP) and
an Internet server. The SP acts as the KGC in the CLC.
That is, the SP first runs Setup algorithm to setup the
system parameters. Then the SP runs PPKE algorithm to
generate the partial private keys for the base station and the
SP. The base station and the server run UKG algorithm to
generate their secret values and public keys. In addition,
the base station and the server run FPKS algorithm to
obtain their full private keys. The base station is loaded
with the precomputed result d from OffSC algorithm. When
the WSNs is required to send data to the server, the base
station runs OnSC algorithm and sends the ciphertext r ¼
ðc; h; S0; TÞ to the server. When receiving the r, the server
runs USC algorithm to recover the data m and verify the
validity. In this communication, the confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation are simulta-
neously achieved. The computational cost of base station is
very small since there is no any point multiplication,
exponentiation or pairing operation in the OnSC algorithm.
If the data are large, we also can used hybrid encryption
method [16]. That is, we compute c ¼ EH3ðrÞðmÞ instead of
c ¼ m H3ðrÞ. Here E is the encryption algorithm for a
symmetric cipher (such as AES [31]) and H3ðrÞ is the
session key. Such modification does not affect the security
and efficiency of our scheme.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new certificateless online/
offline signcryption scheme and proved its security in the










































































Fig. 4 The private key size of the three schemes
Fig. 5 A secure communication model for the IoT
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certificateless online/offline signcryption schemes, our
scheme does not require any point multiplication operation
in the online phase. This characteristic makes our
scheme very suitable for resource-constrained devices. We
gave an application of our scheme in the Internet of Things.
A weakness of our scheme is that a receiver’s identity is
required in the offline phase. An interesting work is to find
a certificateless online/offline signcryption scheme that
does not need a receiver’s identity in the offline phase and
does not need any point multiplication operation in the
online phase.
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